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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

STATE OF rTAH,
Res~ndent,

-vs.-

Case. No. 7808

VIRGIL THOMAS,

Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Virgil Thmnas, defendant and appellant herein, was
convicted of the crime of burglary in the third degree
arising out of the burglary of a car belonging to one
Edward Underwood, whereby certain tools contained in
the glove compartment of the car were stolen. The burglary occurred on August 15, 1950, someti1ne between the
hours of 7 :00 o'clock A.M., and 12 :00 o'clock noon. The
3
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crime was not reported until August 16, 1950. At approximately 12:00 o'clock noon on the 15th of August,
1950, Officer Wilson A. Allen, of the Ogden City Police,
received a call to proceed to the National Tavern, 25th
Street, Ogden City, to check "Slick" Thomas, "he was
trying to sell some tools." (Tr. 21) Defendant was arrested with the too~s in his possession, later identified
as those stolen. The evidence shows defendant made explanations of his possession of the stolen tools at the time
of his arrest and again ~t the trial, and that they were
not consistent. (Tr. 22, 33, 34) A trial was had before
a jury, defendant was convicted and he appeals.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
DIRECT A VERDICT OF NOT GUILTY.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GRANT
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
DIRECT A VERDICT OF NOT GUILTY.

It is proper for the trial court to refuse to direct a
verdict when the determination of guilt depends upon
4
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the credibility of witnesses or the evidence is sufficient
to overcome the presun1ption of innocence. The trial court
is not justified in directing a verdict when disputed facts
would support n1ore than one conclusion, or where, admitting all the facts for the purposes of the motion and giving then1 a reasonable construction in favor of the party
against whom the motion is directed, it appears that the
evidence is not such that reasonable men would not differ.
Where the case is a close one on the evidence a directed
verdict should be refused. A directed verdict should not
be given upon a mere preponderance of the evidence.
53 Am. J ur., Trial, § 362, 363, 365 ; 17 ALR 917, 918, 930.
At page 10 of Appellant's brief it is admitted the
State did prove a burglary had been committed and that
property was thereby stolen. The corpus delecti was
therefore established. State v. Kinghorn, 109 Mont. 22,
93 P. 2d 964, 968. The stolen property was identified
by uncontroverted testimony (Tr. 11, 12, 19), as the same
found in possession of defendant at the time of his arrest.
(Tr. 22, 23)
Defendant attempted to explain his possession of the
burglarized property on two occasions. (Tr. 22, 33, 34)
These explanations were contradictory. If defendant's
explanation is to serve him to advantage it is necessary
that it be satisfactory. This court, in the case of State v.
Brooks, 101 Utah 584, 126 P2d 1044, 1046, sets forth
the tests an explanation of stolen property has to meet
before it will be considered satisfactory.
5
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"* * * Webster defines satisfactory as: Releaving the mind from doubt or uncertainty; yielding content; adequate for the purpose; serving
to allay the demands of a challenger or questioner. See, also, Shriver v. Union Stock Yards
National Bank, 117 Kan. 638, 232 P. 1062, 1066.
It is a sta;tement which enables the mind to rest
thereon with confidence. Pittman v. Pittman, 72
Ill. App. 500; State v. rrrosper, supra. It is satisfactory when of such a nature that a court or
jury, as men of ordinary intelligence, discretion,
and caution, may repose confidence in it. Jackman v. Lawrence Drilling & Development Co., 106
Kan. 59, 187 P. 258. It does not mean beyond
a reasonable doubt, but it should not be ambiguous, equivocal, or contradictory; it should be perspicuous, and cause the mind to repose confidence
in it. American Freehold Land Mtg. v. Pace, 23
Tex. Civ. App. 222, 56 S.W. 377; sufficient for a
reasonable person acting in good faith, Secklir
v. Penny, 148 Misc. 807, 266 N.Y.S. 327. Adequate
and sufficient to convince a reasonable person;
sufficient to produce a belief that the thing is true
or to justify the court in adopting the conclusion
in support of which it is adduced. Walker v.
Collins, 8 Cir. 59 F. 70, 8 C.C.A. 1; and to cause a
reasonable person under all the circumstances to
believe in its sufficiency; it is such an explanation that the court is pre·suaded in its own mind
thereby, that the possession is lawfully accounted
for." (Italics added)

f

In commenting on the effect of an explanation of
stolen property found in the possession of a defendant
the court further states :
"Where defendant's explanation is not such
as to meet these requirements, is not such as to
6
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persuade the n1ind of the court to repose sufficient confidence therein, to relieve the mind from
doubt or nnrertainty and allay the question or
doubt in the n1ind of the court, it is proper to subInit the cause to the jury, to determine, not the
satisfartoriness of defendant's explanation but the
question of his guilt in the light of all the evidence
i11clud iJ1!7 his e.rpla nat ion if he made any." (Italics
added)
It is respectfully submitted that defendant's explanation of his possession of the stolen property is not one
in which the Inind of the court could repose confidence.
Indeed, the circumstances under which defendant was
arrested and his conflicting explanations tend to prov:e
his guilt. Officer Allen testified he received a call to go
to the National Tavern and check "Slick" Thomas, "he
was trying to sell some tools." (Tr. 21) At the time of
his arrest defendant's testimony was evasive, and contradictory of his later story. (Tr. 22)

"OFFICER ALLEN: * * * when I pulled
up with the police car, the defendant was standing
in front of the National Tavern, right in front, I
think, with three other fellows, by a meter post,
and as I got out of the car I seen he had something in his hand, in his arn1, and he shoved it
under his coat as I got out of the car. I walked
over and asked what he had, and he stated he
had a jug. I said, 'Let's see what you got, Virgf
He said, 'I got a jug.' I opened his coat and these
tools fell out. They were in a torn blue bedspread,
a piece, that had the tools in this. I said, 'Virg,
this don't look look much like a jug to me.' He
didn't have much to say. I asked where he got
them, and he said, 'I got them down to his place.'
7
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I asked where his place was and he said, 'You
know where my place is.' He finally told me, 'His
mother's place.' I went and checked the story he
got them at his hmne and found he hadn't got
them there. * * *."
This is a piece of the same blue bedspread proved to be
at the. scene of the crime. (Tr. 10, 11, 12)
In court defendant came forward with a story that
the tools were given him by a friend. On direct examination defendant testified as follows: (Tr. 33)

"Q. In your own words I would like you to tell
the jury how you came into possession of the
tools 1
A.

Well, a friend of mine came over and handed
them to me and as soon as he handed them to
me I was arrested by Officer Allen. I didn't
know what they were but he wanted sixty-five
cents for the tools."

The eye-witness testimony of Officer Jacobsen places the
tools in defendant's exclusive possession before the. time
defendant says they were handed to him by his friend.
The Officer's testimony on direct examination reveals:
(Tr. 50-51)·

"Q. Alright, tell the court and jury the circumstances under which you saw the defendant.
A.

I just came out of the Eagle Clothing from
purchasing a 'T' shirt.

Q.

Where is that in relation to the National
Tavern~

8
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A.

I would say three or four doors west, approximately. I was just going to get in my
car, and I was advised by a person that Mr.
Thomas,.. ~Ir.

GL~-\S~L\.N:

I object to that as hear-

say.
··THE COURT: Objection sustained.
"A.

After I got in my car I noticed Mr. Thomas
come out of the National Tavern, at this time
he had a bulge under his coat, and as he
reached the sidewalk, he was right about to
the middle of the sidewalk he dropped a
wrench, and the falling of this wrench, I
noticed it, and he looked at me and made
some remark, I don't just recall what it was,
and due to the information told to me before
that, I immediately went down to George's
Cafe, where I called and asked if we had any
tools missing, and I was informed by the desk
sergeant that information could be received
from Officers Allen and Mitchell the patrol
car detail and I was advised to give them
the information that I had.

Q. What did you

do~

A. I waited in front of the Cafe a short time and
Mr. Allen came down and picked up Mr.
Thomas.

Q. Did you have occasion to observe Roy Allen,
the man who just testified~
A.

Yes sir, he was coming from the direction
of the west, as I went to my car I noticed him
coming. A person called to me and that is
how I noticed him, he was a short distance
between this fellow, Mr. Allen came up and
9
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joined approximately four fellows, I wouldn't
say the number, but Allen came up and talked
to those men.

Q.

Did you observe the group conversing prior
to the time Officer Allen arrived~

A.

Yes sir.

Q. Did you observe any package given to the
defendant1
A.

No sir, not while he was on the sidewalk or
any other time."

Officer Jacobson established the time elapsing between the first time he saw defendant and defendant's
arrest to be seven to ten minutes "not over ten minutes."
(Tr. ·54) At another point in the record defendant testified he was arrested within "two minutes" after he handed them (the tools) to me." (Tr. 34)
Certainly, these inconsistencies in defendant's story
and the contradictory circumstances do not supply a
satisfactory explanation, nor are they consistent with
innocence.
This court, in State v. Kinsey, 77 Utah 348, 295 P.
247, 249, said:

"* * * Possession of articles recently stolen,
when coupled with circumstances of hiding or concealing them, or of disposing or attempting to
dispose of them, or of making false or unreasonable or unsatisfactory explanations of the possession may be sufficient to connect the possessor
with. the commission of. the offense."
10
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The instant case presents. culpatory circumstances
which were not present in the Kinsey case. Gransbury
v. State, 64 Okla. Criin. Rep. 408, 81 P2d 874, 876, 877,
supplies an interesting detail. There defendant was arrested four miles frmn the scene of the burglary within
a few hours after the crime had been committed. Not
only possession of the burglarized wheat was proved,
but a board which was shown to have been at the scene
of the burglary was found on defendant's truck. The
conviction of burglary in the second degree was sustained.
·
The record in this case shows the stolen property in
the possession of defendant, within a short distance from
the scene of the burglary, within five hours from the time
complaining witness parked his car, and before the burglary came to his attention; further, defendant had in his
possession, wrapped about the stolen tools, a piece of
blue bedspread torn from that which complaining witness
used as a seatcover. (Tr. 9, 10, 11, 12)
That recent possession of burglarized property
creates an inference of fact to be considered by the jury
with all other circumstances, in determining the guilt or
innocence of accused is supported by State v. Tucker,
36 Ore. 291, 61 P. 894, 51 LRA 247. Payne v. State, 21
Tex. App. 184, 17 S.W. 463, holds that recent pos·session
of stolen property should be considered by the jury
whether defendant gave any explanation or not. See further State v. Royce, 38 Wash. 111, 80 P. 268. In People
v. Taylor, 40 P. 2d 870,-4 Cal. App. 2d 214, it was held
that the truth of defendant's explanation as to how he
11
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came into possession of the stolen property is a question
for the jury. In addition, the court said, at page 871:

"* * * Flight, false statements showing consciousness of guilt, or as to how the property came
into defendant's possession, assuming a false
name, inability to find the person from whom defendant claimed to have received the property,
have each in turn been held to be sufficient to connect the accused with the crime when proven in
connection with possession of the stolen property.
(Citing cases.)"
This court has repeatedly adopted the position that
unless there is no evidence to support the verdict the
determination of the jury will not be disturbed on appeal.
State v. Halford, 17 Utah 475, 54 P. 819; State v. Webb,
18 Utah 441, 56 P. 159; State v. Endsley, 19 Utah 478,
57 P. 430. See also People v. Willard, 150 Calif. 543, 89
P. 124, 128, where the Court said:

"* * * This court cannot disturb a verdict unless there is no evidence to support it, or where
the evidence relied on by the prosecution is apparently so improbable or false as to be incredible,
or where it so clearly and unquestionably preponderates against the verdict as to convince this
court that its return was the result of passion
or prejudice on the part of the jury."
The evidence adduced by the State connecting the
defendant with the crime was direct, substantial, and
clearly sufficient to warrant submission to the jury, and
to authorize the jury to find as they did.
Respondent respectfully submits that in view of the
circumstances connecting defendant with the burglary,
12
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the failure of defendant to satisfactorily explain his possession of the stolen property, and the neces'Sary reliance
on the credibility of witnesses to determine defendant's
guilt, the trial court properly refused to grant appellant's
motion for a directed Yerdict. Indeed, a view of all the
facts makes mandatory a conclusion they are not consistent with the idea that defendant's possession was
innocent; therefore defendant's guilt or innocence became
a fact for the jury.
It is further submitted that the evidence, both circumstantial and direct, to be found in the record, unquestionably supplies sufficient evidence upon which the
verdict of guilty may rightfully rest.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GRANT
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

Appellant states three grounds to support his motion
for a new trial. They are: (1) insufficiency of the evidence to warrant submission of the case to the jury; (2)
insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict of
guilty; (3) misconduct of the Assistant District Attorney.
Appellant has chosen to argue the third ground only.
We think alleged grounds one and two raise no issues
not dealt with under Point I of respondent's brief, and
respondent respectfully submits there is substantial evidence in the record to establish the negative of these two
propositions; therefore our argument here will be directed to the third ground only.

13
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The particular act of the prosecuting attorney alleged as a grounds for a new trial in his purported threat
to prosecute defendant's witness, Roy Allen, if he did
not tell the truth. This, it is claimed intimidated the witness to the point of adversely influencing the manner in
which the witness gave his testimony before the jury.
This meeting between the prosecutor and Witness
Allen took place outside the court room, away from the
jury, and before ·the afternoon session of the court was
· called to order. (Tr. 036-5, 6) There is no allegation that
the testimony of this witness was any different after the
meeting with the prosecutor than it would have been
before, and the testimony he did give was substantially
the same as that given by another of defendant's witnesses, Francis W. Stoddard. (Tr. 26-30, 41-43)
A like problem is dealt with in the case of Henwood
v. People, 57 Colo. 544, 143 P. 373, 380, Ann. Cas. 1916A
1111. There the District Attorney, in a published interview said he was ''going to see to it" there was no perjured testimony. Appellant in a motion for a new trial
alleged intimidation of the defense witnesses. The court,
in passing on the issue, had this to say:

"* * * we think it must affirmatively appear
that defendant was prejudiced thereby, before
such matters can be said to constitute error, and
in the absence of such showing the claim made
that he was is purely speculative. Moreover, it
is apparent, that from the statement published,
that it only referred to witnesses testifying falsely. Such a statement could not have frightened
an honest witness * * *."
14
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To the same effect it' the case of State v. Williams,

124 La. 779, 50 So. 711, where the District Attorney, before trial asserted he would have witnesses arrested for
perjury if they did not tell the truth. The court refused
to regard this as 1nisconduct substantially affecting the
rights of the accused.
We respectfully submit that unless it is made to
appear that defendant has been prejudiced and deprived
of a substantial right a new trial should not be granted
where an examination of the entire record reveals that
defendant had a fair and impartial trial, and his conv~c
tion is supported in law and in fact.

CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that a review of
the transcript and proceedings in this case discloses ample and sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction of
appellant of the crime of third degree burglary. That
the alleged misconduct of the prosecuting attorney was
not such as to prejudice defendant's right to a fair and
impartial trial. The conviction should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
CLINTON D. VERNON,

Attorney General
RICHARD J. MAUGHAN,
Assistant Attorney Gene.ral
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT.
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